ABSTRACT To See Is To Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets
In a wide range of decision problems, the optimal course of action for an agent depends critically on their expectations regarding the behavior and therefore implicitly the rationality of others. This is the case not only in many important applied problems of business strategy, but also in the corpus of theory that economists have developed to model such interactions. As is well known, standard solution concepts such as rationalizability and backward induction demand high levels of mutual knowledge of rationality, resulting in stark equilibrium predictions that frequently fail in the experimental laboratory (Nagel, 1995; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) . Yet, what is less commonly acknowledged is that these settings arguably also stretch the limits of the experimental method itself. For while an experimenter can control such features as the set of players, the strategies at their disposal and resultant material payos, it is far more dicult for the experimenter to credibly control the epistemic conditions that are also required for equilibrium predictions to obtain in particular the beliefs that players hold regarding the rationality of their counterparts. Nonetheless, when experimental ndings fail to conrm equilibrium predictions, it is tempting to conclude that this must reect some failure of rationality itself rather than the common knowledge thereof.
In this paper, we reconsider these issues in the context of the mispricing commonly observed in the asset market experiments introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, hereinafter SSW).
In particular, we reexamine the recent claim that this mispricing is due to confusion, and can be ameliorated by training subjects to understand fundamental value (FV). We instead reassert the centrality of subjects' expectations, by proposing that the coordination of expectations may be facilitated when it is public knowledge that such training has taken place. To test this conjecture, we manipulate whether or not it is public knowledge that all traders in a market have undergone training. We show that training to reduce confusion is alone not sucient to diminish mispricing, and that it is also necessary to make known to the market that confusion has been rectied.
The phenomenon of price bubbles and crashes in SSW-style asset market experiments was for many years considered a paradox or anomaly. Over the two decades that followed publication of SSW, a large body of research sought to identify and eliminate the sources of this mispricing, with only limited success. 1 SSW's original interpretation of their discovery was that dierences between 1 King, Smith, Williams, and van Boening (1993), van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993), Porter and Smith (1995) , and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) manipulate aspects of the rules of the institutions that govern exchange.
Porter and Smith (1995), Smith, van Boening, and Wellford (2000) , Noussair, Robin, and Rueux (2001) , and price and FV may be due to a lack of common, not irrational, expectations (p. 1120), and that it is the failure of the assumption of common expectations, not backward induction incompetence by subject agents that explains bubbles (p. 1148, emphasis added). That is, although the dividend structure of the asset was made public knowledge by the experimenter, each subject might still have been uncertain as to how others would use that information. However it was neither necessary, nor did it seem likely to SSW, that subjects actually failed to comprehend the information itself.
More recently, however, a new conventional wisdom has taken hold. According to this view, mispricing in SSW markets is simply a product of subject confusion over the FV process, which declines over time due to the nite life of the dividend-paying experimental asset (and may thus be inconsistent with subjects' homegrown expectations derived from real-world assets). Consistent with this view, several recent studies nd that when care is taken to train subjects to correctly understand the declining FV, mispricing in SSW markets is substantially diminished. Stöckl (2012) display the current FV on the trading screen throughout the experiment. Each of these protocols is found to produce patterns of mispricing that are less pronounced than is typical in SSW-style markets.
3 In our interpretation, if subjects were to trade appropriately conditional upon an incorrect understanding of FV (as the confusion view suggests might be the case), it is debatable whether the resulting price trajectory should be characterized as a bubble. It is for this reason that we adopt the language of mispricing throughout our paper.
4 Thus, for example, the well-known result that mispricing in SSW markets is diminished with repetition which SSW interpreted to show that subjects came to form common expectations by learning the behavior of others through experience is reinterpreted to indicate that subjects were instead learning to understand FV. It follows that an appropriate training protocol could serve as a substitute for such experience (Lei and Vesely, 2009 ).
uncertainty over the behavior of others namely that some subjects must doubt the rationality of others, and thus perceive an opportunity for speculation. To test this, LNP designed treatments in which speculation was not possible (by prohibiting subjects in the role of buyers from reselling, and subjects in the role of sellers from repurchasing), and nonetheless observed many transactions at prices that were as a consequence certain to be unprotable. From this, LNP were careful to conclude that the lack of common knowledge of the rationality of market participants . . . can be ruled out as being the only cause of the bubble phenomenon (p. 834, emphasis in original). 5 In this paper, we reassert the centrality of common expectations, as rst emphasized by SSW, in the wake of the nding of confusion and the new conventional wisdom that confusion is the main driver for mispricing (Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl 2012, p. 865) in SSW markets. Since LNP establish that doubts over the behavior of others are well-founded, it follows that protocols that facilitate common expectations cannot wholly substitute for ones that address the underlying confusion. However, it does not follow that the two may not be complements. Nonetheless, we submit that all recent bubble-reducing protocols in fact share a second common feature namely the fact that it is public knowledge that all subjects in the market have been jointly exposed to the protocol.
We assert that in making the training of declining FV public knowledge, these recent studies may have inadvertently had the eect of reducing uncertainty over the behavior of others and resolving the problem of coordinating subjects' price expectations and that this may in itself have contributed to the nding of diminished mispricing. 6 To evaluate this conjecture, we report new experiments in which we manipulate both whether or not subjects are trained to understand FV, and whether or not it is public knowledge that all subjects in the market have undergone this training. 7 Through this design, we are able to disentangle the direct eect of training in reducing confusion 5 Smith (2010, p. 6) acknowledges that SSW's original interpretation of their bubble nding was falsied by the LNP result; however he does not wholeheartedly endorse the notion that the subjects were confused. 7 We speak of public knowledge of training to make clear that we do not claim that this suces to establish common knowledge of rationality. This is because the formal concept of common knowledge involves higher-order beliefs, about which we have no direct evidence. Nonetheless, since LNP establish the presence of actual irrationality in the absence of training, we assert that common knowledge of rationality is impossible when i) confusion has been reduced through training, however ii) this is not public knowledge.
4 from the eect of its public knowledge in facilitating common expectations.
We nd that when all subjects in a market are trained to understand diminishing FV, but this is not public knowledge, mispricing is as great as when training is absent. However, mispricing is substantially diminished when it is public knowledge that all subjects have been trained. Thus while redressing confusion is necessary to diminish mispricing in SSW markets, it is not sucient without also making it known to the market that confusion has been corrected. We conclude that just as SSW were mistaken to disregard the possibility of confusion, the recent literature has itself been remiss in neglecting the importance of common expectations as rst emphasized by SSW. 8 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines our design, including details of our training and public knowledge manipulations. Section 2 presents our results, and Section 3 concludes.
1 Design
Market environment
In each market, ten subjects trade shares of a dividend-paying asset in exchange for experimental currency units (ECU) in a computerized double auction over fteen four-minute trading periods.
The distribution of initial endowments is summarized in Appendix A; valued at FV, each subject has the same initial wealth. After each period, each share pays a common dividend which, following SSW's classic Design 4 parameters, takes values of 0, 8, 28, or 60 ECU, each with equal probability.
After the fteenth period, shares expire without any terminal value. The FV of a share is thus given by the product of its expected dividend per period (24 ECU) and the number of dividends remaining.
In particular, the FV is 360 in period one, and declines by 24 in each subsequent period. We follow standard practice in the SSW literature by making FV information public knowledge in the form of an average holding value table which is contained within the instructions. 9 8 We do not contest the view, also advanced in the recent literature, that the SSW design has some unusual features that may lack external validity (Oechssler 2010, Kirchler, Huber, and . In addition to declining FV, these include a nite horizon, increasing cash-to-asset ratio, and high dividend yields.
9 See the Online Appendix for the full instructions, which also include a screen shot of the double auction interface. 5
Training protocol
Our protocol to train subjects in the FV process consists of two sets of control questions one framed from the perspective of buying a share, and the other framed from the perspective of selling.
We include fteen questions in each frame, ordered from period fteen to period one.
In the buyer frame subjects were asked, for t = {15, 14, . . . , 1}:
Suppose that you buy one share in period t and that you keep it until the end of the market (i.e. until period 15). What is the average total dividend that you will receive from this share?
Similarly, in the seller frame subjects were asked, for t = {15, 14, . . . , 1}:
Suppose that you sell one share in period t and that you do not buy it back. What is the average total dividend that you give up on this share?
We require subjects to answer both sets of questions, thereby eectively requiring them to enter the FV values from the average holding value table twice, from the bottom up. 10 In each of the sessions in which subjects were required to answer these questions, the experiment did not commence until all of the subjects who were required to do so had answered all of the questions correctly.
Treatments
We operated two markets in each session, for a total of twenty subjects. Our design consists of four treatments, which dier in whether or not subjects were required to complete the training task before the experiment could begin, and whether or not this was public knowledge. In the two treatments in which subjects answered control questions, it was always the case that all ten subjects 10 By presenting the questions in reverse order, our protocol was intended to highlight the backward induction of FV, as opposed to its declining value per se. In this respect, it was modeled upon the futures market protocol of Noussair and Tucker (2006) . At the time that we developed it, we were unaware of several of the more recent protocols described in footnote 2. Nonetheless, we consider the various procedures to be comparable, in that they all seek to reinforce subjects' understanding of the FV information contained in the instructions.
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in the market were required to do so; these treatments therefore dier only in whether or not this fact was public knowledge. We collected a total of six observations (markets) in each treatment.
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In the Public Knowledge (PK) treatment, all subjects were required to successfully complete the training task, and this was public knowledge. Subjects were informed that the experiment would not begin until all twenty subjects in the session had correctly answered all of the questions.
To obtain the treatments we refer to as NPK and WAIT, we informed all twenty subjects in a session that some of them would be asked to answer some control questions, and that those subjects would have to answer all of the questions correctly before the experiment could begin. The remaining subjects would not be asked any questions, and would simply wait for the experiment to begin.
Of the twenty subjects in these sessions, we required ten to answer the full set of questions. Through a message on their computer screens, we informed these subjects that exactly ten of the subjects in the session would be required to answer the questions. What they were not told is that all ten would be grouped together to trade in the same market. This market thus consisted of ten subjects who had all completed the training task successfully but who did not know that all others in the market had also done so. We refer to this treatment as Not Public Knowledge (NPK).
As a byproduct of NPK we also had ten subjects in these sessions who did not complete the training task and were simply required to wait for the others to nish. These ten subjects were grouped together to make up the second market in the session. Through a message on their computer screens, we informed these subjects that when the experiment began, none of the subjects in their market would have answered any questions. 12 We refer to this treatment as WAIT.
Finally, in our BASE treatment none of the subjects in the session were required to complete the training task, and they did not have to wait for others to do so before the experiment could begin.
Thus, to reiterate the key feature of our design: In both treatments PK and NPK, all subjects in the market were trained to understand the declining FV process by requiring them to correctly answer the control questions; however only in treatment PK was this made public knowledge.
We thus have the same number of markets in each of our treatments as in the recent papers by Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012) and , and a larger number than in the seminal paper by LNP.
12 We did this to control these subjects' expectations with respect to the training history of their counterparts, and thereby enable us to test for the pure eect of waiting time in WAIT compared to BASE. No subject had taken part in any previous asset market experiment. We recruited subjects using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) , and the experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) .
At the start of each session, we distributed and read aloud the rst part of the instructions dealing with the mechanics of using the computer interface to make price oers and to buy and sell shares.
This was followed by a ten-minute practice period, which did not count toward subjects' earnings.
To minimize any anchoring eect of the practice prices, subjects completed the practice task before being told the dividend structure of the asset or how their earnings would be determined.
We next circulated and read aloud the remainder of the instructions, dealing with the dividends, average holding value table and calculation of earnings. Following this, some subjects were required to complete the training task as appropriate to the treatment (as detailed above).
Upon conclusion of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire consisting of some basic demographic items, the three-item Cognitive Reection Test (Frederick 2005) , and a ten-item test of nancial literacy derived from van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). 13 Sessions lasted up to 2.5 hours, and the average earnings were DKK 239 (approximately USD 48 as of November 2009).
Hypotheses
Our design allows us to tease apart the eects of requiring subjects to wait before the experiment can begin (under treatment WAIT), of requiring all subjects in the market to successfully complete the training protocol when this is not public knowledge (under treatment NPK), and of making it public knowledge that all subjects successfully completed the training (under treatment PK).
The existing literature indicates that there is likely to be substantial mispricing under BASE, and considerably less under PK. By examining the decomposition of this dierence, as seen through the 13 We conducted a comparison of subject characteristics across the four treatments. The only signicant dierences were that there were fewer females in PK compared to BASE, and that subjects in PK had lower nancial literacy than those in NPK and WAIT. We do not think it plausible that these dierences would account for our results.
8 intermediate treatments WAIT and NPK, we expect to be able to shed light upon the mechanism through which training results in diminished mispricing.
Our rst testable hypothesis concerns the eect of requiring our WAIT subjects to wait for others to complete the training task before the experiment can begin. By giving these subjects more time in which to think through the information in the instructions, it is possible that this might itself result in reduced mispricing even in the absence of any training.
Hypothesis 1: Mispricing is less severe under WAIT compared to BASE.
Our second hypothesis states that we expect to replicate the recent nding that mispricing is reduced when all subjects have been trained to understand FV, and this is public knowledge.
Hypothesis 2: Mispricing is less severe under PK compared to WAIT and BASE.
Our next two hypotheses are concerned with disentangling the eect of training from that of its public knowledge. Insofar as the eect is due to training per se, we would expect it to also be observed when it is not public knowledge that all subjects successfully completed the training.
Hypothesis 3: Mispricing is less severe under NPK compared to WAIT and BASE.
On the other hand, insofar as it is the public knowledge of training that accounts for diminished mispricing, we would expect the eect to be more pronounced under PK compared to NPK.
Hypothesis 4: Mispricing is less severe under PK compared to NPK.
Measures of mispricing and overvaluation
We follow the recent literature in reporting the measures of Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) for mispricing, and Relative Deviation (RD) for overvaluation, as introduced by Stöckl, Huber, and Kirchler (2010) . The formal denitions of these measures are stated in Table 1 . RAD measures the average absolute deviation of price from FV, and may thus be interpreted as a measure of the overall severity of mispricing without regard for sign. On the other hand, RD measures the average direction of price deviations, permitting periods of over and undervaluation to cancel out. Relative Absolute Deviation RAD = 1 T t
Note: T = total number of trading periods;P t = mean transaction price in period t; f t = fundamental value in period t;f = mean fundamental value over the life of the asset.
Since we express our hypotheses in terms of mispricing, our preferred measure is RAD: if the eect of our treatments were to reduce the incidence of both over and undervaluation, this would be clearly evident in the form of a lower RAD, but the same would not necessarily be true of RD. Looking rstly at the thick black line that represents the treatment mean, while it is evident that this tracks most closely to FV under treatment PK, it is also clear that it does not dier all that greatly across the four treatments. On average, it is the case in each treatment that prices tend to be moderately undervalued in the early periods and somewhat overvalued in the middle to later
periods. This provides a rst indication that there do not appear to be strong dierences between the treatments in terms of average overvaluation. Median transaction price Period in which average overvaluation is only mild, this only holds because we observe both some markets that exhibit pronounced overvaluation and others that are characterized by dramatic undervaluation and these cancel out in computing the treatment means. That is to say, we do indeed observe substantial total mispricing, and moreover this does indeed appear to vary across the treatments.
In particular, it is clear that the price paths of the individual markets typically track FV more closely in the PK treatment than under either WAIT or BASE. Interestingly, however, this does not appear to be the case for the NPK treatment. This provides the rst indication that simply training subjects to understand FV may not on its own be sucient to reduce mispricing relative to treatments in which training is absent. On the other hand, when it is also public knowledge that all subjects have completed the training, then mispricing does indeed appear to be diminished. 15 To formalize these observations, Table 2 reports an analysis of the measures RAD (for mispricing)
and RD (for overvaluation). The top panel reports means of these measures for each of our four treatments. more accurately accounts for the possibility that our treatments might reduce the incidence of both over and undervaluation. Nonetheless, we report corresponding tests for RD in the second column.
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Result 1: Mispricing is not signicantly lower under WAIT compared to BASE. Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
Our rst hypothesis concerns the possibility that simply allowing subjects in WAIT more time to think might itself have the eect of reducing mispricing. However, we clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis that RAD is at least as great under WAIT as under BASE (p = 0.420). We thus pool the data from WAIT and BASE in our tests of hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Result 2: Mispricing is signicantly lower under PK compared to WAIT and BASE.
Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Our second hypothesis states that we expect to replicate the nding of previous studies which show that when all subjects are trained to understand the FV process, and this is public knowledge,
19
The p-values in the second column of Table 2 thus correspond to tests of hypotheses, analogous to the ones stated in Section 1.5, in which the words Mispricing is less severe are replaced by the words Overvaluation is lower.
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The two-sided p-values for the null hypotheses of equality of WAIT and BASE are 0.840 (RAD) and 0.861 (RD).
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mispricing is less than when training is absent. We indeed nd that RAD is signicantly lower under PK than under WAIT and BASE pooled (p = 0.023). This conrms that our training protocol produces results that are comparable to those of other recent studies.
Result 3: Mispricing is not signicantly lower under NPK compared to WAIT and BASE. Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Having established that training has a signicant eect when it is public knowledge, our next hypothesis concerns whether the eect continues to be observed when all subjects in the market are trained, but this is no longer public knowledge. This is what we would expect if the eect of training operated simply through reducing subjects' confusion, and not through facilitating the coordination of expectations. We nd that this is not the case, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that RAD is at least as great under NPK as under WAIT and BASE pooled (p = 0.186). When training is not public knowledge, mispricing is not signicantly less than in markets in which training is absent, indicating that training alone is not sucient to produce an eect in our setting.
Result 4: Mispricing (and overvaluation) is marginally signicantly lower under PK compared to NPK. There is mild support for Hypothesis 4.
Our nal hypothesis concerns the eect of making it public knowledge in treatment PK that all subjects have been trained to understand the FV process, compared to treatment NPK in which all subjects have been trained but this is not public knowledge. Note that the signicance of this comparison is inhibited by the limited number of observations, and the presence of considerable within-treatment heterogeneity in NPK in particular. Nonetheless, we indeed conrm that RAD is marginally signicantly lower under PK than under NPK (p = 0.080). We also note that there is a marginally signicant eect on overvaluation as measured by RD (p = 0.088).
Thus to summarize, in both NPK and PK all subjects were trained to understand diminishing FV;
all that diers is whether or not this was public knowledge. Consistent with previous studies, we nd a signicant reduction in mispricing when training is combined with public knowledge. However when training is not public knowledge it has no signicant eect, and mispricing is substantial.
3 Conclusion
Our results are consistent with the few other experimental studies we are aware of that credibly manipulate subjects' expectations regarding the rational play of their counterparts. Thus, Fehr and Tyran (2001) nd that subjects exhibit substantially more pronounced money illusion when playing a price-setting game with other humans than with computerized agents who they know to have been pre-programmed to play optimally. They interpret this to show that the greater part of money illusion operates indirectly through strategic uncertainty over the behavior of others, which is absent in the computerized condition. Likewise, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) study the play of student subjects and chess players in a laboratory centipede experiment. They nd that students in the role of the rst mover are ten times more likely to stop the game at the rst decision node (as predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium) when playing a chess player as opposed to another student. Conversely, chess players are less likely to stop the game when their opponent is a student as compared to another chess player. They interpret these results to indicate that players' assessment of the rationality of opponents is critical in determining whether subgame-perfect play emerges.
We interpret our own results to indicate that the greater part of the eect of training subjects to understand FV in SSW markets does not simply operate through reducing confusion, as recent studies have presumed, but instead relies upon making known to the market that confusion has indeed been reduced. It appears that when it is public knowledge that everyone has undergone training, subjects perceive less uncertainty over the behavior of others and since they may be less inclined to doubt the rationality of others less opportunity for speculation. In short, the eect of making training public knowledge may be to facilitate the coordination of subjects' common expectations on FV as the equilibrium price path. These eects cannot operate in the absence of public knowledge, even when it is in fact the case that all subjects indeed have a correct understanding of FV.
Our interpretation is consistent with SSW's original conjecture that a price bubble could form even when all traders were sophisticated, if that fact was not common knowledge. Indeed, we believe that our NPK treatment represents a reasonable approximation to the conditions that SSW originally postulated. These conditions did not hold in the original SSW experiments because of the very real possibility of confusion, as rst demonstrated by LNP. In our NPK treatment, while training addresses confusion at an individual level, the common knowledge of rationality is nonetheless rendered impossible. Under these conditions, we continue to observe substantial mispricing.
We also note that our interpretation aligns with the conclusion of a recent study by Xiong and Yu (2011) , who examine the sources of a bubble in Chinese put warrants in the period 20052008. They take advantage of the nite life of these warrants to derive an upper bound on FV using a form of backward induction logic. Their preferred explanation for this bubble combines constraints on short sales (also present in standard SSW markets) with heterogeneous beliefs, and they explicitly interpret their data in terms of SSW's hypothesis of the non-common knowledge of rationality.
In conclusion, we challenge the claim of recent several studies that mispricing in SSW-style markets is purely an artefact of subject confusion. Instead, we submit that by not only training subjects to understand declining FV, but also making this public knowledge, these studies did not only resolve the problem of confusion, they also inadvertently resolved the problem of coordination of expectations. Thus, just as SSW were mistaken to disregard the possibility of confusion, the recent literature has also been premature in reaching the conclusion that confusion is solely to blame. This is because that literature has itself neglected SSW's original insight regarding the centrality of common expectations, which we nd to be fundamentally sound.
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Appendices A Experiment parameters Relative Absolute Deviation
Note: T = total number of trading periods;P t = mean transaction price in period t;P t = median transaction price in period t; f t = fundamental value in period t;f = mean fundamental value over the life of the asset; q t number of transactions in period t; q = total number of shares outstanding. 
General Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you.
In this experiment, you have the opportunity to buy or sell in a market. The money used in this market is`Experimental Currency Units' (ECU). All trading will be done in terms of ECU. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in Danish kroner. The conversion rate will be 11 ECU to 1 krone.
You will then be asked to complete a questionnaire, after which you will receive your payment.
The entire experiment will last approximately two-and-a-half hours, including half an hour for instructions and practice.
How to use the Computerized Market
On the top right of the screen you will see how much time is left in the current trading period. The items you can buy and sell in the market are called shares. In the center of your screen you will see the number of shares and the amount of money you currently have.
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The screen can be used to participate in the market in one of four ways.
Making an oer to sell a share, by entering the price at which you would like to sell:
To oer to sell a share, enter the price at which you would like to sell in the box labeled`Enter oer to sell' on the left of the screen, then click on the button`Submit oer to sell'.
The second column from left will show a list of oers to sell, each submitted by a dierent participant.
The lowest oer-to-sell price will always be on the bottom of the list. Your own oer will appear in blue. Submitting a new oer will replace your previous one.
Making an oer to buy a share, by entering the price at which you would like to buy:
To oer to buy a share, enter the price at which you would like to buy in the box labeled`Enter oer to buy' on the right of the screen, then click on the button`Submit oer to buy'.
The second column from right will show a list of oers to buy, each submitted by a dierent participant. The highest oer-to-buy price will always be on the bottom of the list. Your own oer will appear in blue. Submitting a new oer will replace your previous one.
Buying a share, by accepting an oer to sell:
You can select an oer to sell in the second column from left by clicking on it. If you click the`Buy'
button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share at the selected price. However you are not allowed to buy a share from yourself.
When you accept an oer to sell, it will disappear from the list. If you had also placed an oer to buy, it will disappear from the oers to buy list because you have just bought a share.
Selling a share, by accepting an oer to buy:
You can select an oer to buy in the second column from right by clicking on it. If you click thè
Sell' button at the bottom of this column, you will sell one share at the selected price. However you are not allowed to sell a share to yourself.
When you accept an oer to buy, it will disappear from the list. If you had also placed an oer to sell, it will disappear from the oers to sell list because you have just sold a share.
Transaction prices
When you buy a share your money decreases by the price of the purchase. You can only buy a share if you have enough money to pay for it.
When you sell a share your money increases by the price of the sale. You can only sell a share if you owned one to begin with.
In the middle column of the screen, labeled`Transaction prices', you will see the prices at which shares have traded in the current period.
